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Medical Treatment for Imprisoned
Paraphiliacs: Implementing a Modified
Standard for Deliberate Indifference
I. Introduction
In July, 1984, John Doe, an inmate in a Connecticut prison, filed a
habeas corpus petition alleging that the prison system had denied
him adequate and necessary medical treatment.' Such petitions are
not unusual; what distinguished Doe's was the nature of his claimed
disease and the treatment he sought. Doe, incarcerated for a sex
offense, claimed to be suffering from a psychosexual disorder called
paraphilia 2 and sought treatment involving both psychiatric coun-
seling and the administration of a hormone, medroxyprogesterone
acetate, better known as Depo-provera. 3
The constitutional obligation of prison authorities to furnish
medical treatment is undisputed;4 failure to provide necessary and
adequate medical treatment to inmates is proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. 5 Courts have struggled, however, with implementing
the obligation in cases where the issue is not a simple failure by
prison authorities to provide any medical care, but rather a disagree-
1. This Comment could not have been written were it not for the courage that the
Petitioner showed in pursuing his legal claims. Though every document cited in this
Comment as relating to the Petitioner's legal proceedings appears in the public record,
it is the desire of both the author and the Petitioner that publicity involving the identity
of the Petitioner be kept to a minimum. Therefore, throughout this Comment the Peti-
tioner's legal proceedings will be cited as Doe v. Bronson.
If more information concerning either the legal proceedings or the Petitioner is de-
sired, the author may be contacted by way of the Yale Law & Policy Review.
2. See infra note 9.
3. Depo-provera is the trade name of a drug manufactured by the Upjohn Company.
The active ingredient is medroxyprogesterone acetate, a synthetic progestin hormone
normally present in low levels in the human body. See PROSPECTUS OF THE BIOSEXUAL
PSYCHOHORMONAL CLINIC, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE (1984)
[hereinafter cited as PROSPECTUS].
4. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
This Comment addresses the right of prisoners to receive medical treatment. If per-
sons incarcerated under sex offender statutes are considered involuntarily committed
patients for the purpose of liberty-interest decisions, their right to treatment is more
likely located in the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982) (majority endorsed trial court's determination that
mental health patient had a "constitutional right to minimally adequate care and treat-
ment," but concluded that the patient's liberty interests lay in "minimally adequate...
safety and freedom from undue restraint").
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ment between the inmate and prison authorities over the type of
treatment due the inmate. 6 In the Connecticut case, such a disa-
greement arose from the refusal by the Department of Correction to
provide the inmate with a treatment regimen including Depo-
provera, despite the recommendations of two psychiatrists not asso-
ciated with the prison.7 The Department replied to. the allegations
in the habeas petition by asserting that the inmate had received ade-
quate therapy in the form of two group therapy sessions.8 This
Comment addresses the problems posed by implementation of a
constitutional right to treatment in disputes over specific treatments
by examining the case of mentally-disordered sex offenders.
II. Paraphilia and the Psycho-Organic Model
Paraphilia is a learned pattern of deviant sexual behavior. Re-
searchers of paraphilia know that some early-life experience ac-
counts for the type of deviant sexual behavior associated with the
paraphiliac.9 Paraphiliac symptomatologies include persistent, in-
trusive sexual fantasies centered around unconventional, even bi-
zarre, sexual conduct that result in intensive erotic cravings to act
out the fantasies.' 0  When these impulses cannot be fulfilled, the
6. E.g., West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1978) (dispute between inmate and
prison officials over appropriate amount of post-operative care); Mackey v. Camp, 415 F.
Supp. 323 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (refusal of physician to perform removal of non-threatening
bullets as desired by inmate does not establish denial of care).
7. Petitioner's Exhibit 20, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1 (letter of Dr. Fred Berlin,
May 14, 1984, recommending Depo-provera and psychotherapy); Petitioner's Exhibit
25, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1 (letter of Dr. Pierre Gagne, March 21, 1983, same).
.Both doctors subsequently testified that their initial diagnoses and recommendations
remained the same at the time of the habeas hearing. Testimony of Dr. Fred Berlin, Doe
v. Bronson, supra note 1, Trial Transcript at 46-47 [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Dr.
Berlin]; Testimony of Dr. Pierre Gagne, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1, Trial Transcript
at 133-34 [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Dr. Gagne].
8. Response to Habeas Petition, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1.
9. See Berlin & Coyle, Sexual Deviation Syndromes, 149 JOHNS HOPKINS MED. J. 119
(1981). Child abuse or other preadolescent sexual trauma is commonly at the core of
deviant sexual behavior.
10. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS III 266-267 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. DSM-III is
the official manual of mental disease and disorders, and is used for diagnoses and treat-
ment. The entry for paraphilia follows:
The essential feature of disorders in this subclass is that unusual or bizarre im-
agery or acts are necessary for sexual excitement. Such imagery or acts tend to be
insistently and involuntarily repetitive and generally involve either: (1) preference
for use of a nonhuman object for sexual arousal, (2) repetitive activity with humans
involving real or simulated suffering or humiliation, or (3) repetitive sexual activity
with nonconsenting partners. . . .Paraphiliac imagery is necessary for erotic
arousal. . . .In the absence of paraphiliac imagery there is no relief from nonerotic
tension. . .. [Paraphilias] are of legal and social significance. Individuals with these




paraphiliac suffers noxious, discomforting feelings." Because a
paraphiliac's fantasies and cravings are so frequent, the need to act
them out is also frequent, and when not under actual physical re-
straint, the paraphiliac finds it extremely difficult-if not impossi-
ble-to stop behaving in a sexually deviant manner.12  Many
paraphiliacs experience deep emotional anguish from their inability
to control their deviant fantasies.' 3 Nevertheless, one distinguish-
ing feature of paraphilia is the paraphiliac's unconcern for the social
repercussions of his behavior; paraphiliacs will act out their behav-
ior regardless of the consequences they might suffer if they are
caught. 14
Possible consequences have become more severe as sex offend-
ers' 5 have drawn increasing attention from the public and many leg-
islators. Public concern, particularly in cases involving child
molestors, pedophiliacs,' 6 has resulted in intensive news cover-
mental health professionals only when their behavior has brought them into conflict
with society. . . .[S]pecific paraphilias are (1) Fetishism (inanimate objects),
(2) Tranvestitism (female clothing), (3) Zoophilia (animals), (4) Pedophilia (chil-
dren), (5) Exhibitionism (public display of sexual organs), (6) Voyeurism (watching
sexual activity of others), (7) Sexual masochism (the infliction of pain on self),
(8) Sexual sadism (the infliction of pain on others).
Id.
Some of the best case studies of paraphilia can be found in Berlin & Meinecke, Treat-
ment of Sex Offenders with Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment Mo-
dalities, and Preliminary Findings, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601 (1981). These case studies
indicate that the paraphiliac's fantasizing and erotic cravings are not scattered random
occurrences; they are repetitive and constantly intrude on the subjects' conscious
thought. See also Cordoba & Chapel, Medroxyprogesterone Acetate Antiandrogen Treatment of
Hypersexuality in a Pedophiliac Sex Offender, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1036 (1983); Gagne,
Treatment of Sex Offenders with Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 644
(1981); Spodak, Zalde & Rappeport, The Hormonal Treatment of Paraphiliacs with Depo-
provera, 5 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 304 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Spodak].
11. See Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 10.
12. See DSM-III, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Berlin, supra note 7, at 47 (discussing extent of Doe's
mental anguish); Testimony of Dr. Gagne, supra note 7, at 151-52 (noting that in his
opinion, approximately 95% of paraphiliacs endured less mental anguish than Doe).
14. DSM-III, supra note 10, at 267 ("Individuals with these disorders tend not to
regard themselves as ill"); Berlin & Coyle, supra note 9, at 125 (describing case study in
which paraphiliac behavior continued despite constant arrests).
15. The term "sex offender" is a legal classification for persons who engage in pro-
hibited sexual behavior. States differ in their classifications of sexual offenses. Compare
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 130.00-.70 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1986) (classifying sexual of-
fenses into sexual misconduct; rape, first through third degrees; consensual sodomy;
sodomy, first through third degree; sexual abuse, first through third degree; aggravated
sexual abuse) with TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.11, 22.011 & 22.021 (homosexual
conduct; public lewdness; indecent exposure; indecency with a child; sexual assault; ag-
gravated sexual assault).
16. The pedophiliac is one who engages in sexual activity, or fantasizes engaging in
sexual activity, with prepubertal children as the preferred or exclusive method of achiev-
ing sexual excitement. DSM-III, supra note 10, at 271.
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age, 17 and has sparked a variety of prophylactic measures designed
to deter such conduct.' 8 Some legislatures have reacted to the pub-
lic outcry by repealing special statutory treatments for the mentally-
ill sex offender.' 9 Many of the repealed statutes sought to identify
sex offenders whose sexual behavior was linked with a mental disor-
der and place them in mental health care facilities for treatment.20
17. Stories dealing with sexual offenders-particularly with child molesters
(pedophiliacs)-garner daily coverage. Of recent note is the controversy involving child
abuse at day-care centers. Perhaps the most notorious example is the McMartin Day
Care Center in Manhattan Beach, California. Everyone who worked there, including a
76-year old grandmother, was charged with criminal sexual misconduct in a total of over
115 separate counts. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1984, at A14, col. 6; id., Mar. 24, 1984, at
A24, col. 5.
18. One need look little further than the television set or the neighborhood super-
market to see examples of society's reaction to child abuse and the related phenomenon
of missing children. CBS regularly broadcasts "Missing Children" biographies which
include the last known picture and location of the child, as well as a general description
(name, age, etc.). Milk cartons are routinely emblazoned with similar information. Con-
gress has acted to provide funds for programs aimed at stopping child abuse. The most
visible form of this support has been a toll-free telephone "hot-line" to help find run-
aways and missing children. Thompson, Congress Considers Means to Fight Sex Abuse of Chil-
dren, Crim. Just. Newsletter, Nov. 15, 1984, at 4-5.
19. For example, since 1980 three out of at least 13 previously enacted statutes pre-
scribing procedures for the civil commitment of mentally disturbed sexual offenders
have been repealed. The 13 statutes, including those that have been repealed, are as
follows: CAL. WELt. & INST. CODE § 6316 (West 1977, repealed 1981) ("Mentally Disor-
dered Sex Offenders"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-211 (1974) ("Sexual Offenders Who
Constitute a Threat of Bodily Harm to Members of the Public"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
3508 (1981) ("Sexual Psychopaths"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 917.012 (West Supp. 1983)
("Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-8. (Smith-Hurd
1980) ("Sexually Dangerous Persons"); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1, 4 (West
1969 & Supp. 1985) ("Sexually Dangerous Persons"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.730
(Vernon 1972, repealed 1980) ("Criminal Sexual Psychopaths"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 173-A:5 (1978) ("Dangerous Sexual Offenders"); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.650 (1981)
("Sexually Dangerous Persons"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.06.060 (1975 & Supp.
1986) ("Sexual Psychopaths"); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 975.01-.18 (West 1969, repealed
1980) ("Sex Crimes Law"); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-13-601, -605 (1985) ("Persons Convicted
of Certain Sex Crimes").
20. The mental health care centers are usually under the supervision of a state De-
partment of Mental Health or its equivalent, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3508 (1981)
(commitment to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, or joint supervision with the Department of
Correction); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 2 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985) (custodial
personnel subject to control of Commissioner of Mental Health with respect to care and
treatment, but subject to Commission of Correction with respect to administration, op-
eration and discipline). Statutes authorizing commitment, supra note 19, vary regard-
ing the point during criminal proceedings when commitment procedures are instituted.
The District of Columbia, upon findings of a judge, commits sexual psychopaths to a
mental hospital and stays all criminal proceedings in the interim. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
3508, -3510 (1981). Massachusetts gives the trial judge discretion to place sex offenders
with mental disorders in a mental health center in lieu of the sentence ordinarily re-
quired by law. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123A, § 5 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985). Florida
sentences sex offenders for their crime first, FLA. STAr. ANN. § 917.012(1) (West Supp.
1983), and then binds them over to the Department of Mental Health for evaluation and
treatment if they are suspected of having a mental disorder linked to their sexual behav-




While public reaction to sexual crimes has resulted in fewer op-
portunities for mentally ill sex offenders to receive treatment, re-
search advances have increased the effectiveness of treatment for
some psychosexual disorders. One area of research into psychosex-
ual disorders has been based on the psycho-organic model of behav-
ior.2 1 This model hypothesizes that human behavior is the result of
both learned and unconscious patterns of behavior, with particular
behavior dependent on, or responsive to, physiological systems in
the human body.22
Researchers posit that within the neurological system controlling
the mind, 23 the powerful biological function of the sex drive over-
rides conscious attempts to restrain the deviant sexual conduct asso-
ciated with paraphiliacs due to the influence of organic factors-
such as testosterone on the limbic brain 24 -that continually rein-
21. The psycho-organic model of human behavior is also known by a variety of other
names. These include "behavioral biology," "behavioral endrocinology," "biological
psychological," "physiological psychology" and many others. See KONNER, THE TAN-
GLED WING 16 (1982). This Comment focuses on the process by which the paraphiliac's
behavior is shaped by psychological and organic factors and the effect recognition of this
process should have on the standard for medical treatment. This Comment, therefore,
chooses to use the term "psycho-organic" because it serves to highlight the model's
claim that both psychological and organic factors underly mental disorders and both
psychotherapy and organic therapy are required for treatment.
22. The psycho-organic model hypothesizes that neurological systems affect behav-
ior traditionally regarded as caused only by external mental stimuli. Severe depression,
for example, has its roots not merely in a traumatic, grief-filled occasion, but in several
neurotransmitter systems that deepen depression and make it more acute.
Norephinephrine is a brain neurotransmitter molecule linked with depression. Stud-
ies indicate that the onset of depression causes changes behaviorally, physiologically,
and biochemically. Severe, or psychopathological, depression is treated with organic-
based therapy. In addition to counseling, patients are treated with "tricyclic anti-de-
pressants" which function, either by stimulating the production of norephinephrine or
preventing its reabsorption by producer cells, to make more norephinephrine available
to stimulate brain cells, thereby elevating the patient's mood. See KONNER, supra note
21, at 339, 340.
23. An example of a neurological system which affects behavior is the stria terminalis,
a slender compact fiber bundle connecting the amygdala with the hypothalamus and
other basal forebrain regions. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1351 (24th ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL DICTIONARY]. It is hypothesized to mediate the excitatory
influence of the limbic system (the "emotional" or "reptile" brain, to which both the
amygdala and the hypothalamus belong) on sexual and aggressive behavior. See KON-
NER, supra note 21, at 117.
Linked with the limbic system is the endocrinal system, which governs the secretion of
testosterone by the interstitial cells of the testes. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra, at 1431.
Testosterone lowers the threshold for "firing" of the nerve fibers in the stria terminalis,
additional evidence for the hypothesis that testosterone influences sexual and aggressive
behavior. KONNER, supra note 21, at 117.
24. Sexual behavior is associated with the lower, more primitive portion of the brain
called the limbic system. See supra note 23. The limbic system is comprised of the hypo-
thalamus, the amygdala, the hippocampus, the limbic midbrain, the septal area, and the
regions of the neocortex associated with these lower structures. All have been impli-
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force and maintain the learned sexually deviant behavior. The
psycho-organic explanation of sexual behavior hypothesizes that ef-
fective treatment of deviant sexual behavior cannot result simply
from attempts to alter sexual conduct through traditional psycho-
cated to some degree in the motivation and regulation of sexual activity. See KONNER,
supra note 21, at 280.
Testosterone is a product of the endocrinal system. It is secreted by the interstitial
cells of the testes, and is classified as a sex steroid hormone. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra
note 23, at 1421, 1431. It is hypothesized to affect the development of the brain, nota-
bly in the forward portion of the hypothalamus (the portion of the brain partially re-
sponsible for sex and aggression, supra note 23), helping to account for observed
differences in brain development between men and women and corresponding observa-
tions that males are innately more aggressive than females. See Field & Raisman, Sexual
Dimorphism in the Neuropil of the Preoptic Area of the Rat and its Dependence on Neonatal Andro-
gen, 54 BRAIN RESEARCH 1 (1973); Clayton, Kogura & Kraener, Sexual Differentiation of the
Brain: Effects of Testosterone on Brain RNA Metabolism in Newborn Female Rats, 226 NATURE
810 (1970). Testosterone's influence on sexual behavior is demonstrated by its effect
on sexual learning. The hypothalamus-pituitary unit of the limbic system manufactures
what are called neuropeptides. These neuropeptides are involved in the formation and
maintenance of new behavior. See de Wied, Bohus, Gispen, Urban, Van Wimeisne &
Greidanus, Hormonal Influences in Motivational, Learning, and Memory Processes, in HOR-
MONES, BEHAVIOR, AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1 (Sachar ed. 1976). In sexual "learning,"
that is, the development of gender awareness and the development of sexual drive, one
study suggests that testosterone's influence on sexuality can override social rearing. See
Imperato-McGinley, Peterson, Gautier & Sturla, Androgens and the Evolution of the Male-
Gender Identity among Male Pseudohermaphrodites with 5-alpha-reductase deficiency, 300 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1233 (1979) (males, raised from infants as females and exhibiting female
behavioral patterns- in fact, thinking they were females-abandoned gender role upon
onset of testes development and testosterone production).
The linkage of testosterone to sexual behavior is most clearly demonstrated by the
effects of castration. In laboratory animals castration causes a decline of sexual activity,
and also reduces aggression. Subsequent injection of testosterone into castrated males
restores both sexual activity and aggression. Depo-provera, because it suppresses the
production of testosterone in the testes, when administered is called "chemical castra-
tion." Unlike castration, however, Depo-provera's effect is temporary and reversible.
That testosterone may play a role in paraphilia is shown by one study in which 27% (6
out of 22) of paraphiliacs were found to have abnormally elevated levels of testosterone
in their blood. See Berlin & Coyle, supra note 9, at 122. Contrary to popular misconcep-
tion, however, elevated testosterone levels are not the only organic substrate responsi-
ble for paraphilia. What is important to remember is testosterone's role in the organic
reinforcement of sexual behavior. See supra note 23.
It is also hypothesized that deviant sexual behavior may be linked with defects in the
limbic brain. All the structures of the limbic brain receive and concentrate testosterone.
In the Berlin & Coyle study, 90% (18 out of 22) of paraphiliacs evidenced a variety of
abnormalities including, "structural brain damage, elevated testosterone levels, genetic
anomalies, seizure disorders, and pituitary hormone dysfunction." Berlin & Coyle, supra
note 9, at 122. Studies have also shown that lesions on the limbic brain can cause severe
and noticeable changes in sexual activity. See Clark, Cagiula, McConnel & Antelman,
Sexual Inhibition is Reduced by Rostal Midbrain Lesions in the Male Rat, 190 SCIENCE 169
(1975). Studies with epileptics have demonstrated that a majority of epileptics whose
seizure focus is in or near the amygdala or hippocampus are hyposexual (suffer from a
diminution or lack of sex drive); epileptics whose seizure focus is located in other parts
of the brain are not hyposexual. See Blumer, Changes of Sexual Behavior Related to Temporal




therapeutic techniques, but must also address the organic reinforce-
ment system.
For the mentally ill sex offender, the psycho-organic model hy-
pothesizes that treatment 25 must identify and address the organic
substrates that influence or trigger deviant sexual behavior as well
as treat the psychological aspect of the behavior. This type of treat-
ment for psychosexual disorders, called "organic-based" therapy
for the purposes of this Comment, 26 combines the use of pharmaco-
25. "Treatment" refers to the medical or surgical management of a patient. MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY, supra note 23, at 1477. Palliative treatment seeks to alleviate symptoms
without curing. Medical treatment is the conservative treatment of disease by hygiene
and medicinal remedies. Surgical treatment involves direct physical intervention to treat
disease. The term "treatment" is used interchangeably with the term "therapy" which
similarly connotes the management of disease by various methods.
26. Treatment is referred to as organic therapy if it encompasses a set of procedures
designed to modify human behavior by altering the chemical or neurological bases of
behavior, feeling, or mentation. See Delgado, Organically Induced Behavioral Change in Cor-
rectional Institutions: Release Decisions and the 'New Man' Phenomenon, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 215,
217 n.3 (1977). This definition includes therapy utilizing surgical, chemical, and elec-
tronic means to modify certain types of criminal behavior by direct physical intervention
into neural or physiological mechanisms. Id. at 218. For examples of the various tech-
niques used in organic treatments, see Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavioral Controk
Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 240-46 (1974).
Organic therapy stands in contrast to traditional nonorganic behavior therapies, such as
counseling and psychotherapy, which rely solely on persuasion, insight, and exhortation.
Delgado, supra, at 217 n.3.
Organic therapists have been criticized because they have the potential to "bring
about changes, even radical changes, in a patient's behavior without his cooperation."
Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755, 777
(1969). Professor Katz warns that organic therapies can render the subject "docile and
agreeable to subsequent interventions... [and] can cause alterations in behavior that are
reversible and irreversible." Id. (footnote omitted).
In contrast to pure organic therapy, organic-based therapy refers to a broad-based
treatment regime which includes organic therapy as a component. Organic-based ther-
apy, therefore, differs fundamentally from pure organic therapy in that it frequently re-
lies on a psychotherapeutic component which requires initial subject cooperation for
success.
The roots of organic-based treatment may be traced back at least thirty years to the
introduction of lithium salts for the treatment of manic-depression in 1939. See generally
R. JOHNSON, THE HISTORY OF LITHiM THERAPY 94-104 (1984). Indeed, it has been
noted that the explosion in the development and sophistication of the psychiatric profes-
sion can be directly correlated with the realization by the profession that therapy that
included the use of drugs could result in astounding successes for the profession in
treatment. One author notes that the effects of the new drug treatments "facilitated the
opening of doors, full occupation, encouragement of initiative, freer communication,
and the restoration of an atmosphere of hope" in the treatment of the mentally ill. A.
NORTON, THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF MEDICINE 142-43 (1969). The effectiveness of drug
treatments for the mentally ill elevated psychiatry to a new respect in medicine:
If affective disorders could be eliminated by the simple expedient of administering a
chemical substance, did this not suggest that the basis of these disorders might take
a chemical form?. . .At a stroke, the elusive, aetherial Freudian psyche was replaced
as the primary object of attention in psychiatry by the polyphasic, physico-chemical
system called the brain. Psychiatry came of age, and took its place amongst the
biological sciences.
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logical (drug) and psychotherapeutic intervention.
Organic-based therapy for paraphilia utilizes Depo-provera, the
synthetic form of a human anti-androgen that suppresses the pro-
duction of testosterone in the testes.27 The reduction in testoster-
one levels neutralizes one of the key factors in the sexual drive
system and results in the immediate diminution of the symptoms
and behavior associated with paraphilia; specifically, the administra-
tion of Depo-provera is unique in reducing the constant erotic
fantasizing of paraphilia. 28 In addition to administration of Depo-
provera, the psycho-organic model requires psychotherapeutic in-
tervention to address the psychological components of paraphilia.29
R. JOHNSON, supra, at xiv.
Organic-based therapies for sex offenders have been studied and used for over a dec-
ade. The first reported studies utilizing Depo-provera in conjunction with psychiatric
counseling as a treatment for paraphilia were performed by Dr. John Money at the Johns
Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland in 1965. See Money, Wiedeking, Walker &
Gain, Combined Antiandrogen and Counseling Program for the Treatment of 64,XY and 4 7,XYY
Sex Offenders, in HORMONES, BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 104 (Sachar ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Money & Gain]; Money, Wiedeking, Walker, Migeon, Meyer & Bor-
gaonkar, 47,XYY and 46,X Males with Antisocial and/or Sex-Offending Behavior: Antiandrogen
Therapy plus Counseling, I PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 165 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Money & Borgaonkar].
27. The level of serum testosterone (testosterone in the bloodstream) is reduced in
antiandrogen therapy to that of a normal prepubescent boy (from approximately 575
nanograms/100 milliliters to 125 nanograms/100 milliliters). The "average" starting
dosage of Depo-provera for an adult male is an intramuscular injection ranging from
400 mg. to 600 mg. per week. See Berlin & Coyle, supra note 9, at 119 (use of 500 mg./
week); Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 10, at 603 (400 mg./week); Gagne, supra note 10, at
644 (400-600 mg./week).
An antiandrogen is any substance capable of preventing full expression of the biologi-
cal effects of androgenic hormones on responsive tissue. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra
note 23, at 86. Medroxyprogesterone acetate inhibits the release of luteinizing hormone
(LH) from the pituitary gland. LH is the chemical messenger which normally stimulates
the testes to produce androgens, especially testosterone. This results in the lowering of
the level of testosterone in the bloodstream. See PROSPECTUS, supra note 3 (describing
antiandrogenic effect and mode of endocrine action of Depo-provera).
28. Clinicians report that the frequency and intensity of erotic fantasizing decreased
substantially. See Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 10, at 603; Gagne, supra note 10, at 645;
Cordoba & Chapel, supra note 10, at 1038; Spodak, supra note 10, at 309.
29. All the researchers used psychotherapy in conjunction with Depo-provera ther-
apy. Berlin & Coyle, supra note 9, at 123; Cordoba & Chapel, supra note 10, at 1039;
Money & Gain, supra note 26, at 105; Gagne, supra note 10, at 646.
Dr. Gagne analogizes Depo-provera to a "brain relaxant"- by allowing the brain a
respite from the paraphiliac's constant fantasizing and craving, the paraphiliac is made
more accessible to psychotherapeutic methods. Nonorganic methods are then used to
assist the individual to "unlearn" the pattern of behavior associated with his paraphilia.
Petitioner's Exhibit 25, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1. See also PROSPEC-rUS, supra note 3
(counseling necessary to help the patient cope with problems that have developed as a
consequence of his prior life style). Others have noted that when "the threshold or
barrier to sexual arousal is strengthened by the hormone [Depo-provera] the individual
is metaphorically on vacation from the demands and insistence of his sexual drive, and
so is able to experience an erotic or psycho-sexual realignment in conjunction with




Usually, psychotherapy treats the deeply rooted early-life traumas
that produced the deviant behavior and attempts to readjust the pa-
tient away from focal points of unnatural or proscribed behavioral
patterns. 30 In addition to attempting to "unlearn" the deviant be-
havior, psychotherapy also addresses the social adjustment
problems the paraphiliac will confront.
An organic-based treatment regimen is recognized as one of the
few, if not the only, effective treatment for paraphilia. 31 At present,
any physician can prescribe Depo-provera for a diagnosed
paraphiliac. 32 Depo-provera thus is one of the treatments that must
be at least considered in a treatment-specific33 dispute between an
30. Psychotherapy most commonly involves psychological treatment of mental disor-
ders without the use of physical or chemical means. As one source defines it:
[P]sychotherapy [is] a form of psychological treatment in which a trained person
(psychotherapist) establishes a professional relationship with a person (patient, cli-
ent) suffering from emotional problems for the purpose of alleviating, or modifying
troublesome symptoms or patterns of behavior. . . .All forms of psychotherapy are
based on common psychological principles of operating in any helping relationship,
including comfort, support, guidance, reason, guilt-reduction through confession,
and hope. . . .[I]t represents a more or less systematic effort to help a patient
achieve maturity, autonomy, responsibility, and skill in adult living.
DICTIONARY OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 304 (B. Wolman ed. 1973).
31. The data is generally anecdotal in the form of case studies. See Berlin & Mei-
necke, supra note 10; Spodak, supra note 10. Where a large number of individuals have
been tested, however, the effectiveness of Depo-provera in reducing the symptomolo-
gies of paraphilia has been consistently high. See Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 10, at
604-05 (noting 17 out of 20 responded favorably to treatment); Money & Gain, supra
note 26, at 120 (17 out of 17 sex offenders received beneficial effect from treatment);
Gagne, supra note 10, at 645 (40 out of 48 responded favorably). It should be noted that
this Comment does not seek to argue that treatment including Depo-provera and psy-
chotherapy is either appropriate or necessary for all paraphiliacs-rather, this Comment
uses the current research into treatment for sex offenders to illustrate the implementa-
tion of the modified Estele standard this Comment proposes. See infra notes 62-85 and
accompanying text.
32. Depo-provera is approved for use as a treatment for cancer in the United States.
Rosenfield, The Food and Drug Administration and Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, 249 J. A. M. A.
2922, 2924 (1983). Physicians, however, have great discretion in the uses they may
make of drugs approved for only limited purposes:
Once a product has been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for
uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not included in ap-
proved labeling. Such "unapproved" or, more precisely, "unlabeled" uses may be
appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, in fact, reflect ap-
proaches to drug therapy that have been extensively reported in medical litera-
ture. . . .[A]ccepted medical practice often includes drug use that is not reflected
in approved drug labeling.
Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULLETIN 1 (April 1982).
33. For the purposes of this Comment, "treatment-specific" will refer to a particular
method of treatment or therapy; thus, it can encompass a category of treatment as broad
as organic-based therapy or a type of treatment within a category as specific as Depo-
provera/psychotherapy. While treatment-specific disputes involving alternative treat-
ments from different categories might raise a stronger case of deliberate indifference, see
infra notes 62-85 and accompanying text, as in the case where an inmate seeks organic-
based therapy while the prison offers only psychiatric counseling, this need not suggest
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inmate and a prison physician. Indeed, a few states have explicitly
recognized Depo-provera's importance as a treatment for
paraphilia. 34
III. The Constitutional Right to Treatment
A. Estelle v Gamble
In Estelle v Gamble,35 the Supreme Court held that prison officials
were obligated to provide adequate medical care to prisoners. The
constitutional duty arises because inmates are completely depen-
dent on prison authorities to meet their medical needs. Failure to
meet these needs violates the inmates' rights under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment: 36
In the worst case, such a failure [to treat medical needs] may actually
produce physical torture or lingering death . . . [i]n less serious cases,
denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no one
suggests could serve any penological purpose.3 7
The Court enunciated a two-part standard for determining viola-
tions of a prisoner's right to adequate medical treatment. Prison
authorities violate the Eighth Amendment if: i) a prisoner has seri-
ous medical needs, and ii) by act or ommission, officials demon-
strate deliberate indifference to those needs.38
The Supreme Court has not heard any cases to clarify the stan-
dard articulated in Estelle. Lower courts have interpreted "serious
medical needs" to require only a disease or injury that has been di-
agnosed or can be diagnosed and is amenable to treatment.39 This
requirement is met relatively easily and is used largely as a threshold
test to weed out patently frivolous claims. For example, if a pris-
that narrower treatment-specific disputes cannot also raise constitutional issues. For ex-
ample, a paraphiliac may raise a treatment-specific claim where the only organic-based
therapy offered involves electroshock therapy while his diagnosis as a paraphiliac clearly
calls for organic-based therapy using Depo-provera.
34. Currently, there are approximately 14 programs in the United State which use
Depo-provera to treat sex offenders; this figure includes programs in both penitentiary
and community settings. See Petitioner's Exhibit 22, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1. In
addition, the state legislatures of Tennessee and Texas are considering the creation of a
state-wide system of clinics for sex offenders. Associated Press, Press Release (June 14,
1985) (available on NEXIS).
35. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
36. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
37. 429 U.S. at 103.
38. 429 U.S. at 104.
39. E.g., Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977) (court held that mental
illness constituted a disease or injury for the purposes of the "serious medical needs"




oner were suffering from a slight cold, or perhaps a bruised knee,
either of which would run its course in a few days and cause only
minor discomfort, it would be difficult to sustain a claim under the
Estelle standard. However, were the prisoner suffering from a rare
respiratory illness which the cold could trigger, or were he a hemo-
philiac to whom the bruised knee might prove fatal, denial of treat-
ment would rise to constitutional levels. 40  The de minimis
considerations underlying the "serious medical needs" standard
simply do not apply when dealing with the mental disorder of a
paraphiliac, whose behavioral aberrations have been recognized as
having serious legal and social significance.4'
Lower courts have struggled with the "deliberate indifference"
standard, particularly in handling treatment-specific disputes, that
is, when forced to choose between alternative treatments for a rec-
ognized medical need. Courts recognize that treatment-specific dis-
putes can result in deliberate indifference when an easier but less
efficacious treatment is consciously chosen, 42 or when the care actu-
ally provided is so inadequate as to constitute a refusal to provide
essential care.43 At the same time, however, courts are reluctant to
intervene solely on the basis of a disagreement over the desirability
of a form of treatment between the inmate and the prison
physician. 44
Two concerns underlie judicial reluctance to enter treatment-spe-
cific disputes. The first is ajudicial reluctance to second-guess med-
40. See, e.g., Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974) (only treatment "so
blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggra-
vate the prisoner's condition" gives rise to a constitutional claim).
41. DSM-III, supra note 10, at 267.
42. See, e.g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974) (prison doctor's deci-
sion to amputate inmate's ear and sew up the stump rather than attempt a more difficult
but much more efficacious procedure to preserve the ear found to result in an "easier,
and less efficacious treatment" proscribed by the Eighth Amendment). Although Wil-
liams was decided prior to Estelle, it was cited with approval in the Estelle opinion. 429
U.S. at 106 n.14.
43. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (psychiatric care facilities were so "ridiculously pathetic" as to constitute de-
nial of treatment).
44. See, e.g., Wright v. Collins, No. 84-6001 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 1985) (disagreement
over treatment of injuries sustained in fall would, at most, constitute claim of negli-
gence) (available as ofJan. 15, 1985, on WESTLAW DCT database); Ferranti v. Moran,
618 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1980) (refusal to provide plaintiff with second opinion from his
own back specialist reflected a "mere disagreement" between the prison physician and
patient, not deliberate indifference); Penn v. Starks, 575 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(after decision on other grounds, court noted that even sincere disagreement over the
type and quality of treatment would not state constitutional claim).
Courts have relied on language in Estelle stating that an inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical care, through negligence or accident, does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 429 U.S. at 105-06.
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ical opinions. 45  The judiciary attaches deference to a single
physician's presumed expertise in diagnosis and treatment to an ex-
tent unheard of in other circumstances provoking judicial interven-
tion.46 The second concern is the difficulty involved in attaching
improper motives to physicians' actions. Where deliberate indiffer-
ence is interpreted as creating an intent requirement, 47 courts have
45. Judge David Bazelon, commenting on those who criticized his opinion in Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that the right to treatment established
by District of Columbia statute was guaranteed to those involuntarily committed to
mental hospital by reason of insanity and that failure to treat violates the patients' rights
under the law), has written:
Pundits both legal and medical were swift to point out that adequate treatment is a
quicksilver concept. Different psychiatrists have radically different ideas of what
constitutes good treatment either in general or for a specific patient. Judges have
little basis to choose among the varieties of treatment, and certainly cannot formu-
late for themselves standards for adequate treatment.... [This had] led many critics
toward the conclusion that courts should leave doctoring to the doctors.
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969).
46. Imagine that the Social Security system were set up so that in reviewing the ter-
mination of benefits, a single person would conduct the review, the review would be
limited to a few questions, no opportunity would be given for a discussion of alternatives
or a full explanation of the circumstances, and the decision would be essentially immune
to higher review. Of course, the Social Security system no longer works this way follow-
ing the "procedural due process revolution of the early 1970's." G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 647 (10th ed. 1980) (discussing such cases as
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which held that due process required that welfare
recipients be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits, and
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which held that due process, while flexible,
called for procedural protections matching the demands of the particular situation).
The present system for reviewing prison provision of medical services, however, is not
unlike Social Security review in the pre-Goldberg period. Typically, inmate petitions are
filed pro se (only rare class-action lawsuits possess the force and expertise of real law-
yers). In these cases, the pleadings may be "indecipherable," Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d
at 889, or state conclusions of law, Wright v. Collins, supra note 44, at n.2 (pleadings
alleged "denied me any suffsient (sic) med. treatment... denied adquete (sic) med
treatment. . .denied prober (sic) medical treatment). Judge Bazelon has noted that in-
mate's deficiencies in intelligence and literacy affect the ability ofjudges to understand
writs of habeas corpus or other pro se filings, especially those raising medical claims, and
may result in a general lack of review. Bazelon, supra note 45, at 746. Inmates are also
generally denied access to physicians who might contradict the prison physician's rec-
ommendation. Compare, Lee v. McManus, 543 F. Supp. 386 (D. Kan. 1982) (plaintiff had
two doctors contradict the prison doctor's treatment recommendation; plaintiff had pri-
vate counsel), with, Partee v. Lam, 528 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill 1981) (inmate had only
"mere depression" which the court, for lack of evidence, refused to believe; petition was
filed and argued pro se).
47. One reason for the general unwillingness of the courts to attribute improper
motives to prison physicians may lie in what one physician has described as the prevail-
ing perception of the prison physician:
[P]hysicians are still, by and large, expected to be compassionate, concerned for
man's pain and suffering, and at least tolerant, if not accepting, of man's perversity.
This is expected even if the physician is one of the prison's key-keepers.
Rindle, The Dilemma of a Prison Doctor, 2 THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 7 (Nov. 1972).
It is difficult to find the interpretive basis for an intent standard in the Eighth Amend-
ment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("whether the constitutional




been generally unwilling, except in clearly egregious circum-
stances, 4  to find that physicians have displayed an intentional indif-
ference to an inmate's medical needs by denying his treatment-
specific requests.
As to the first concern, it seems no more difficult for a judge to
evaluate and compare the efficacy of medical treatments than to
make other comparisons routinely required ofjudges in other con-
texts. Judges are commonly called upon to assess, evaluate and
compare in cases requiring expertise not within the judge's domain
of knowledge. 49 Today's judiciary possesses sufficient competence
to make treatment-specific comparisons and choose the treatment
required for a particular disease. The judge must decide only
whether the patient is receiving carefully chosen therapy which re-
spectable professional opinion regards as within the range of appro-
priate treatment alternatives. 50
The second concern also appears to be rooted in a tradition of
deference to the medical profession. Unlike the situation where the
judgment of a physician is in question, courts are quick to find delib-
erate, intentional indifference in cases where non-medical prison
personnel are involved in denying treatment, 5' or where procedures
the motivation of the individual who inflicted it"). Moreover, the present state of health
care in prisons creates an atmosphere in which almost any treatment-specific recommen-
dation by a physician, particularly in the area of mental health, where a full-time prison
psychiatrist is a rarity, represents a conscious choice to inflict needless pain-not be-
cause the prison physician is a Mr. Hyde to his private counterpart Dr. Jeckyll-but be-
cause resources and time to make adequate diagnoses are so scarce, infra, notes 53-60
and accompanying text, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe the better
alternative.
48. See, e.g., Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979) (prescription of eye
drops that inmate had told physician he was allergic to, causing a serious and painful
aggravation of inmate's condition); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
Thomas v. Cannon, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) (injection of penicillin with knowledge that
prisoner was allergic, and refusal of doctor to treat the allergic reaction); Williams v.
Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974) (doctor threw away prisoner's ear and stitched the
stump).
49. Judge Bazelon has further commented:
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists, aeronautical en-
gineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. . . .No judge would claim the abil-
ity to prescribe a particular therapy for a 'chronic and undifferentiated
schizophrenic.' But neither would any judge allocate AM frequencies to avoid inter-
ference. That is not his task in either case; his role rather is to determine whether a
capable expert has studied the problem fully and reached a defensible result.
Bazelon, supra note 45, at 743.
50. Id. at 745. Even though Judge Bazelon, in his article, was defending a decision
that ultimately rested on statutory, not constitutional grounds, his defense of the compe-
tence of the judiciary is surely appropriate to this context-it dealt with a right to treat-
ment and with the tricky question of whether a court can enter the realm of the doctor-
patient relationship to implement that right.
51. See, e.g., West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (prison personnel denied inmate access to
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have been implemented such that access to medical services is rou-
tinely limited.52
What courts overlook in deferring to physicians' presumed exper-
tise is the context within which prison physicians operate. The diag-
nosis, or treatment, in question is the product of a prison health
care system that, in many cases, borders on the totally inadequate
and often may even violate constitutional requirements. 53 The inad-
equacy of medical care facilities and support personnel shifts more
of the burden of routine tasks to the prison physician. 54 In addition,
the prison physician is called upon to perform many other duties
related more to prison security and discipline than to medical care;
these include body cavity searches, initiation of forced feedings and
performance of physical examinations for prisoners being admitted,
transferred or paroled.5 5 Furthermore, inmates generally have
more medical problems than unconfined populations. 56
requested post-operative care for injured leg); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d at 44 (in-
mate denied access to psychiatrist for treating mental disorder).
52. See, e.g. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d at 577-78 (no on-site psychiatrist for prison
population in which 10-25% of inmates required psychiatric treatment); Todaro v.
Ward, 565 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (procedures for access to prison mental health
services so cumbersome as to constitute a denial of mental health services for inmates).
53. Beginning in 1969, attention was drawn to the woeful state of hospital facilities
and medical attention in the nation's prisons. One author pointed out that in a New
Orleans jail, inmates with chronic diseases who should have been confined to bed were
kept on open tiers; that prescribed medication frequently never reached the inmate who
needed it; and that access to medical care was dependent on the whims of guards or
trustees, who allowed access if the bribe were high enough. Goldsmith, Jailhouse
Medicine: Travesty of Justice?, 87 HEALTH SERV. REP. 767 (1972). Despite such publicity,
and the decision in Estelle, a 1981 American Medical Association program report on cor-
rectional institutions revealed that 42.5% of jails had no medical examining room and
71% had no medical bed space. Further, 29.5% had no medical staff to serve inmates
and 31.2% had no responsible physician or medical authority serving in an advisory
capacity. Lessenger, Health Care in Jails: A Unique Challenge in Medical Practice, 72 JAIL
HEALTH CARE 131, 132 (1982).
54. There are many reasons for this inadequacy. The first, and most obvious, is that
there is simply a shortage of funding necessary to maintain adequate prison health serv-
ices which frequently are a low priority for state budget planners. See E. BRECHER & R.
DELLA PENNA, HEALTH CARE IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTiONS 61-63 (1975).
55. Lessenger, supra note 53, at 143; Neisser, Is There a Doctor in the Joint? The Search
for Constitutional Standards for Prison Health Care, 63 VA. L. REV. 921, 945 (1977).
56. One study of New York correctional facilities found that three-fifths of those
admitted were diagnosed as suffering from at least one type of disease, the most com-
mon being drug abuse, psychiatric disorders, trauma and alcohol abuse. Novick, Della
Penna, Swartz, Remmlinger & Loewenstein, Health Status of the New York City Prison Popu-
lation, 15 MED. CARE 205, 215 (1977). One author posits that incarceration makes an
inmate more sensitive to his health, and thereby increases the number of physician visits
per individual as compared with physician vistis of similarly situated unincarcerated per-
sons. Neisser, supra note 55, at 942 (citations therein). Another problem is that physi-
cians find that the normal doctor-patient relationship does not exist in prisons;
cooperation may be replaced by the con. Thus, subjective medical data may be unrelia-




The physicians called on to perform the varied tasks required by
prison administrators may be those least able to handle them. One
study has concluded that prison physicians are divided into two dis-
tinct groups-physicians who work full-time in prisons and those
who work both inside and outside prisons. 57 The majority of physi-
cians in prisons do only part of their work there, yet full-time prison
physicians account for 73% of the physician hours spent in prison.
The problem is that the full-time prison physicians display charac-
teristics associated with a lower quality of health care. A high pro-
portion (33%) of the full-time prison physicians are foreign medical
school graduates with a much lower than average proportion of ad-
ditional postgraduate medical training and specialization; 84% are
not board certified; 56% lack advanced training; 47% have no speci-
ality; and 25% have restricted licenses (licensed to practice only in
that specific institution). 58
It appears, therefore, that most prison physicians simply have
neither the time nor the skill to meet the special diagnostic needs of
prisoners with psychological problems, much less those whose
problems stem from psycho-organic roots.59 In addition, physi-
cians' treatment decisions are often limited by the policies or prac-
tices of prison administrators to whom they must account,
limitations that, were the inmate at liberty, would have no place in
the treatment decision of the physician.60
The above factors weigh heavily against judicial deference to
patient. Lessenger, supra note 53, at 142, 144. Another common reason for the high
utilization rate for prison physicians is that "sick call" (non-emergency visits to the
prison physician usually scheduled during certain periods of the day) is used to avoid
work or school, to give the inmate a little freedom and an escape from boredom or to
serve as a meeting ground. See Lessenger, supra note 53, at 141; Neisser, supra note 55,
at 943.
57. Lichtenstein & Rykwalder, Licensed Physicians Who Work in Prisons: A Profile, 98
PUB. HEALTH REP. 589, 595 (1983).
58. Id. at 593, 595.
59. Diagnosis of a paraphilia is not easy; not all sex offenses are committed by per-
sons manifesting a paraphilia. A propensity for sexual offenses may be the result of
schizophrenia, alcohol use or other causes. See Berlin & Coyle, supra note 9, at 120. The
fact that "[i]t is often necessary to recommend a second or even a third interview to
complete a thorough evaluation of a complex problem," MacKinnon, Psychiatric Inter-
view, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY/Ill 895, 903 (Kaplan, Freedman &
Sadock 3d ed. 1980), coupled with the reality that, initially, the subjective medical data
may be unreliable, supra note 56, makes diagnosis-when time is limited and subject to
the vagaries of prison discipline-a difficult feat, indeed.
60. Prison officials frequently require the use of guards, shackles, and bars, and ham-
per the privacy necessary for the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. See
Lessenger, supra note 53, at 142. This is particularly true in the case of inmates with
psychiatric problems. In most cases, prisoners are unable to alter their diets in accord-
ance with a doctor's prescriptions, adjust their work schedules or keep prescription
drugs in their cells. Neisser, supra note 55, at 940. Physicians must also be aware that
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prison physician diagnoses or treatment-specific decisions. It is dif-
ficult to employ a "reasonable physician" standard, as one lower
court has suggested, 6' when reasonable standards of practice cannot
exist in prisons without either seriously limiting the scope of health
care by devoting more time to individual patients or expanding the
resources and personnel of prison health care. Neither alternative
seems a likely occurrence. A different standard for deliberate indif-
ference, one less heavily weighted in favor of deference to prison
physicians, is necessary to guarantee adequate care in treatment-
specific disputes involving complicated diagnoses.
B. A Modified Test for Deliberate Indifference
The Estelle Court's opinion provides judicial guidance for formu-
lating a modified standard for deliberate indifference. The Estelle
Court explicitly stated that the conditions and treatment of prison-
ers must embody the "contemporary" and "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 62 The use of
the words "evolving" and "contemporary" incorporates the notion
that outdated medical practices, even if previously considered ade-
quate treatment, will not pass constitutional muster.63 This com-
ports with ethical standards promulgated by physicians' groups-
the ethical physician has a duty to keep abreast of developments in
medical care, particularly if she has an area of specialization, a duty
independent of either the physician's or the patient's environ-
ment.64 The ethical duties of a physician also include prescribing
the medical records normally viewed as confidential can be and are used by prison au-
thorities as a source of information. Lessenger, supra note 53, at 142.
61. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d at 47 (prison physician held to the standard of a
physician exercising reasonable care in diagnosis).
62. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
63. This is especially true in the area of modern psychiatric practice. Before 1950,
drug therapy was the exception rather than the rule in psychiatric treatment, and the use
of custodial care, physical restraint and the isolation of patients from their normal envi-
ronment were the primary, and sometimes the only tools used by psychiatrists. See R.
JOHNSON, supra note 26, at xiv.
64. This principle is embodied in physicians' ethical rules:
A physician shall continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge, make
relevant information available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consul-
tation, and use the talents of other health professionals when indicated.
...Psychiatrists are responsible for their own continuing education and should be
mindful of the fact that their's must be a lifetime of learning.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 5 [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL ETHICS].
Chapter 8, Section 1 of the By-Laws of the American Psychiatric Association states,
"All members of the American Psychiatric Association shall be bound by the ethical
code of the medical profession, specifically defined in the Principles of Medical Ethics of




for her patient treatment appropriate to remedy diagnosed injuries.
The appropriate treatment, called the "treatment of choice" by
some physicians, 65 is a standard of care which ties the physician to
the state of present medical knowledge in prescribing treatment.66
Appropriate treatment does not mandate the best possible available
treatment, but rather one which adequately addresses the diagnosis
the physician has reached. 67 For example, if the psychiatrist has
constructed a diagnostic model of the inmate that indicates a
paraphilic disorder and concluded that the inmate suffers mental
distress as a result of that disorder, organic-based treatment consist-
ing of Depo-provera and psychotherapy is the appropriate treat-
ment regardless of its availability. 68
That constitutional obligations may hinge upon the state of medi-
cal knowledge is confirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Roe
v Wade.69 There, the Court relied on "present medical knowl-
edge" 70 and "established medical fact"' in determining that the
end of the first trimester marked the beginning of the state interest
in regulating a woman's pregnancy.7 2 Moreover, faced with conflict-
ing opinions as to when the state's interest in life began, the Court
65. "Treatment of choice" refers only to the treatment developed according to the
diagnostic model the physican constructs from his interview with the patient. See infra
note 67.
66. Cf MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 64, at § 5 (psychiatrists shall continue to apply
and advance scientific knowledge, and be responsible for their own continuing
education).
67. The diagnostic model is completed through a thorough evaluation of the patient
through the psychiatric interview:
In the psychiatric interview, like all medical interviews, one person is suffering and
desires relief; the other person is expected to provide that relief.
MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 895 (quoting R. MACKINNON & R. MICHELS, THE PSYCHIAT-
RIC INTERVIEW IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (1971)).
The diagnostic model includes differential diagnosis, which aims at distinguishing the
various conditions which may have similar symptoms. An accurate diagnosis is required
as a basis for specific treatment. Lewis, Differential Diagnosis, in 2 BAsIC HANDBOOK OF
CHILD PsvCHIATRY 144 (1979). The psychiatrist then develops a treatment plan. The
treatment decision takes into account the needs of the patient who is suffering; usually,
these needs include the patient's most acute and major problems. A treatment plan (or
plans) is then proposed to the patient- not imposed on him-although the patient does
expect the psychiatrist to advise him concerning the treatment best suited for him.
MacKinnon, supra note 59, at 903. " 'Best suited' is a complex notion that includes not
only the subtleties of diagnosis but the patient's emotional, financial, and life situational
resources as well." Id.
68. Dr. Berlin, in Doe v. Bronson, outlined his differential diagnosis process, as well as
his reasons for recommending Depo-provera and psychotherapy treatment, at the
habeas hearing. Testimony of Dr. Berlin, supra note 7, at 23-47. A more formal diagno-
sis is found in Petitioner's Exhibit 25, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1, at 4.
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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chose a medical standard-"viability"-to delineate the boundaries
of that interest. 73 Ten years later, in Akron v Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, Inc. ,74 the Court reaffirmed its decision in Roe and re-
quired, for the "full vindication of the woman's fundamental right,"
that the physician be allowed to exercise her professional medical
judgment, without regulation by the state, until the point at which the
state's interest becomes compelling.75 Toward this end, the state
has been required to give the physician "the room he needs to make
his best medical judgment." 76
The Court's willingness to rely on evolving medical knowledge
suggests a modified test for deliberate indifference in treatment-spe-
cific disputes. Where alternative treatments are proposed, lower
courts should not automatically defer to the prison physician's
choice of treatment, but should instead compare the alternative
treatments in light of present medical standards. 77 The comparison
73. Id.
74. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
75. Id. at 427.
76. Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)).
77. While many find fault with the application of such a shifting scale in the abortion
decision, it makes perfect sense if there are, indeed, different levels of medical care in-
herent in the constitutional right to treatment. If particular treatments are dependent
on the validity of medical facts, the possibility that another, more sophisticated treat-
ment may be invented in the future should not preclude the founding of a constitutional
right to receive treatment upon the present existence of the lesser treatment so long as it
remains the treatment of choice. For example, although a cure for diabetes that does
not require insulin injections may be discovered in ten years, that should not preclude
diabetics from grounding a constitutional claim to insulin on its current status as the
treatment of choice for diabetes.
Similarly, the status of Depo-provera/psychotherapy as the only known effective treat-
ment for chronic paraphilia should strengthen paraphiliacs' ability to raise a constitu-
tional claim for its application. The currently favored medical hypothesis is that deviant
sexual behavior has, as part of its component behavior, reinforcement in the limbic sys-
tem of the brain. Present medical fact links testosterone with the limbic, or sex and
aggression system; medical fact demonstrates that reducing or eliminating testosterone
has the effect of reducing or eliminating sexual behavior; and present medical practice
involving the administration of anti-androgens and psychotherapy has a 95% chance, in
some cases, of controlling paraphiliac behavior. See supra note 24. The possibility that a
newer, better theory and treatment may appear in five years should be irrelevant-until
it occurs. Justice O'Connor, echoing the critics of Judge Bazelon, see Bazelon, supra
note 45, at 742, stated that:
[It is] difficult to believe that this Court. . .believes itself competent to
make. . .inquiries and to revise these standards every time the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). . .revises its views about what is and
what is not appropriate medical procedure in this area.
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor further warned against the Court serving as an "ex officio
medical board with powers to approve and disapprove medical and operative practices
and standards throughout the United States." Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central





should focus on the demonstrated efficacy of the treatments at issue.
Included in this evaluation of efficacy should be an examination of
the symptoms the treatment seeks to alleviate;78 the treatment's suc-
cess in controlling or curing the disorder;79 the behavior it seeks to
alter (in the case of mental disorders);8 0 the side-effects of the treat-
ment, including any intrusive effects upon fundamental rights of the
individual; 8 ' and its acceptance among the medical community.8 2
The credentials of the recommending physician and the prison phy-
sician providing the treatment should be examined, where appropri-
ate.8 3 If the goals of each treatment are the same and the success of
78. Particular attention should be paid to those symptoms which produce the great-
est anguish, either physical or emotional. The search for symptoms should not be con-
fined to those listed under a textbook heading for the individual's disease; diseases affect
individuals in different ways, and it may, therefore, be necessary to address different
symptoms even for individuals with the same disease.
79. By "control," one means the restraint or direct influence of the symptoms and
behavior associated with psycho-organic diseases. "Cure" is more problematic in its
definition and application to psycho-organic disease. It may mean the restoration of a
healthy or normal condition. Remission of signs of a disease may also be called a
"cure." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 496-97, 555-56 (Unabridged ed.
1981). This Comment will use "cure," in the context of psycho-organic disease, to refer
to the complete remission of the disease; the "cured" paraphiliac would require no
pharmacological or psychological maintenance. "Control" will be used to refer to the
remission of psycho-organic disease under the restraint of continuing pharmacological
and/or psychological maintenance. For the most part, comparisons between treatments
will be made by evaluating the relative amounts of "control" they exert over an inmate's
paraphiliac symptoms and behavior. Again, superiority of "control" may vary with the
diagnostic and therapeutic needs of the inmate.
80. This requirement focuses on the effect the mental disorder has on the inmate's
well-being, not on the specific behavioral deviations responsible for his incarceration.
To require the latter would create a right to treatment that simply does not exist in the
Constitution. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). Thus, unless the diseased behavior poses significant stigmatic problems for the
inmate (that is, he cannot confine it to his cell and maintain as "normal" a prison life as
possible) and/or poses a threat to his mental or physical well-being in the prison, behav-
ioral alteration does not assume a position of great importance in the comparison to be
made by the court. Insofar as behavioral change is demonstrative of the alleviation of
symptoms which affect the mental and physical well-being of the inmate, it becomes a
necessary component of the comparison.
81. This includes any intrusion on any of the rights encompassed by the individual's
right to privacy, particularly those relating to the autonomy of thought and ideas. For
example, in one case, psychiatric patients at a state institution were asked to consent to
experimental psychosurgery which produced irreversible effects often including "the
blunting of emotions, the deadening of memory, the reduction of affect, and limit[s on]
the ability to ghenerate new ideas." Kaimovitz v. Michigan Department of Mental
Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2064 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County July 10, 1973). The
court stated that "if the First Amendment protects the freedom to express ideas, it nec-
essarily follows that it must protect the freedom to generate ideas. Without the latter
protection, the former is meaningless." Id.
82. This requirement would not be met by a Gallup poll of physicians. Instead, the
court should, as in many other situations, look to the opinion of experts and leading
practitioners and researchers in the field.
83. In light of the statistics regarding the qualifications of prison physicians, supra
note 58 and accompanying text, this is not an insignificant factor.
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each appears roughly equivalent, such that no "needless infliction of
pain ' '84 would result from the choice of one treatment over the
other, the court should dismiss the inmate's complaint and defer to
the prison physician's choice of treatment. If, however, there are
significant differences in the alternative treatments' goals and effi-
cacy, such that it is clear that the treatment of choice is that sought
by the inmate, a presumptive right to that treatment should be estab-
lished. This presumptive right to treatment must then be weighed
against any interests the state asserts for not providing the re-
quested treatment. If the state's asserted interests are insufficient to
justify denial of the treatment, failure to provide the treatment must
be held to be the result of deliberate indifference by the prison.8 5
IV. Applying the Modified Test for Deliberate Indifference
A. The Efficacy of Depo-provera/psychotherapy Treatment
The prison psychiatrist who has diagnosed the paraphiliac is con-
fronted with an inmate suffering from chronic erotic fantasizing that
inhibits his participation in therapy requiring mental attention.
Although at present, the medical community is still debating
whether or not organic-based therapy is the treatment of choice for
paraphilia, a treatment involving Depo-provera would be highly rec-
ommended for the paraphiliac who has undergone other forms of
conventional psychotherapy and not responded. Depo-provera is
the only treatment available that restricts and suppresses the erotic
fantasies and sexual compulsions that are the symptomatologies of
paraphilia.8 6 It thus has the capacity to alleviate any mental suffer-
ing the paraphiliac experiences as a result of his inability to control
his behavioral and psychological urges and may be the only effective
way to enable the paraphiliac to participate in psychiatric
counseling.87
The lack of either Food and Drug Administration (FDA) label ap-
proval or an overall consensus in the medical community should not
hinder the recognition of Depo-provera's efficacy. One need look
84. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
85. Prior to this stage, but after a presumptive right to treatment had been estab-
lished, it might be appropriate for the reviewing court to continue the case to give the
state the opportunity either to grant the treatment or to find reasons why it should not
be granted. Such a procedure would clear any ambiguity remaining from possible appli-
cation of an intent standard; denial of treatment, after the court had found a right to that
treatment, without a statement of reasons, should suffice to demonstrate intent.
86. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
87. Testimony of Dr. Berlin, supra note 7, at 47; Testimony of Dr. Gagne, supra note




only to the history of lithium therapy for an example of a treatment
regimen which became the treatment of choice before receiving offi-
cial sanction. The use of lithium to treat manic depressives was ini-
tially resisted by most clinicians; however, once even skeptical
clinicians began to use lithium, they found it so effective that many
circumvented the double blind trials in which they were engaged (in
which a control group of patients was given placebos while the test
group was given lithium carbonate) and gave all their patients lith-
ium.88 The fact that FDA approval was required (which is not the
case for Depo-provera) did not stymie medical practicioners. A
large number of psychiatrists during this time employed lithium
therapy without FDA permission because of its efficacy, and the
FDA, though well aware of the practice, did nothing to stop it.89
The major side-effects of Depo-provera include weight gain, in-
creased blood pressure, lethargy, sweats, cramps, dypsnea, hyper-
glycemia and hypogonadism.90 All the effects are fully reversible
after the administration of Depo-provera ceases, usually within two
weeks. 9' As with any pharmacological treatment, some monitoring
is required, 92 and informed consent is usually obtained. 93
Thus, while current medical consensus may not have labeled
88. R. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 100.
89. Id. at 101. The FDA required physicians to file an investigative therapy form
with their office for approval; however, as word of lithium's effectiveness in treating ma-
nic behavior spread, the FDA routinely granted investigative clinical trials and, indeed,
paid no attention to those who did not file an investigative therapy form.
90. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 10, at 603. Critics of Depo-provera have at-
tempted to link it with possible carcinogenicity in tests with female beagles. See Rosen-
field, The Food and Drug Administration and Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, 249 J. A. M. A. 2922,
2924 (1983). However, several researchers refute this correlation. See Liang, Risk of
Breast Uterine Corpus and Ovarian Cancer in Women Receiving Medroxyprogesterone Injections,
249J. A. M. A. 2909, 2912 (1983) (study indicated that there is not likely to be a strong
association between MPA injections and cancer of the breast, uterine corpus or ovary);
Rosenfield, supra, at 2923 ("there appear to be absolutely no contraindications to
medroxyprogesterone acetate use other than pregnancy").
91. The changes attributed to the medication are reversible upon cessation of treat-
ment, usually within seven to ten days. PROSPECTUS, supra note 3. See also Berlin & Mei-
necke, supra note 10, at 603 ("Effects appear to be fully reversible within a few months
after the medication is stopped..."); Gagne, supra note 10, at 646 (absence of irrevers-
ible side effects is one characteristic that may make MPA the drug of choice in treating
patients with a history of deviant sexual behavior).
92. Monitoring can take the form of blood tests to gauge the effectiveness of the
drug in lowering testosterone levels. Typically, a brief hospitalization period is needed
as treatment begins to monitor for side-effects. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 10, at
603; PROSPECTUS, supra note 3; Gagne, supra note 10, at 644-645.
93. ". . .[A] subject's informed consent must be competent, knowing, and volun-
tary. . . .The integrity of the individual must be protected from invasion into his body
and personality not voluntarily agreed to. Consent is not an idle or symbolic act; it is a
fundamental requirement for the protection of the individual's integrity." Kaimowitz v.
Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2064 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
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Depo-provera the treatment of choice for paraphilia, under a pres-
ent medical knowledge standard, Depo-provera must be recognized
as the most effective treatment currently available for paraphilia.
When a prison physician has proposed an ineffective alternative
treatment, such as treatment consisting only of group counselling
sessions, even though the physician's diagnostic model requires an
organic-based treatment, the paraphiliac inmate must be found to
have established a presumptive right to Depo-provera treatment.
B. State Interests
No right, of course, is absolute. State interests of a compelling
nature can be raised to justify an abridgement or encroachment
upon almost any right.94 Several state interests are likely to arise in
the context of a right to medical care including concern for costs,
concern for additional administrative burdens and a desire to avoid
judicial entanglement with state authorities.
The cost consideration is not insubstantial. The development of
the modified test for deliberate indifference has rested in part upon
an indictment of the adequacy of prison medical services. Any at-
tempt to improve the quality and availability of medical services in
any prison as a whole would be very expensive. Such institutional
considerations, however, have not proven to be obstacles to court
injunctions requiring improvements in individual medical care.95
Furthermore, it is not always the case that the inmate's requested
therapy is significantly more costly than that chosen by the prison.
The implementation of Depo-provera therapy, for example, does
not impose any additional significant cost to the state. 96 Indeed, the
bulk of the expense associated with Depo-provera treatment is in-
curred in treating the psychological component of the disorder; 97 in
Doe's case, most such costs were already being incurred in provid-
94. Constitutuional interpretations recognize that compelling state interests nar-
rowly tailored to further governmental objectives can override an individual's constitu-
tional rights. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (advocacy of forcible
overthrow of government constitutes interest sufficiently compelling to allow govern-
ment to punish speech); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing
laws, advancing secular interest in a uniform day of rest, did not violate Free Exercise
Clause).
95. The court in Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1977), noted that "the
Constitution does not stand in the way of a broader attack on the adequacy of an insti-
tute's entire health care system which threatens the well-being of many individuals."
96. The cost of administering a weekly dose of Depo-provera to an inmate, for ex-
ample, would cost the state approximately $14 per week. Testimony of Dr. Berlin, supra
note 7, at 107.
97. By far the largest expenditure is salaries for the mental health personnel neces-




ing the psychiatric counselling recommended by the prison doctor.
In Connecticut, the Department of Correction has apparently aban-
doned the cost rationale for denying treatment and has announced
that any inmate may request and receive Depo-
provera/psychotherapy treatment so long as it is clinically
appropriate.9 8
Interference and entanglement with prison administrators does
not appear to be a major concern in medical treatment cases since
medical care does not directly interfere with the normal day-to-day
functions of prison administrators, namely, prison security and dis-
cipline. 99 Furthermore, most, if not all, of the additional procedures
imposed on the prison by the right to treatment-such as psycho-
logical screenings to determine appropriate treatment-specific rec-
ommendations for psycho-organic disorders or ensuring that
informed consent is present-would be performed by medical care
personnel. Interference has become a superficially valid concern
only because prison administrators themselves have interfered with
the medical process, invoking security or discipline reasons.10 0 The
answer is not to limit treatment but to limit this unnecessary inter-
ference through the development of institutionally independent
medical services within the prison.' 0 '
Another objection which states might raise against implementing
a right to treatment focuses on the disparity such a right might cre-
ate between the level of care of inmates and that of the general pop-
ulation. In other words, states might claim that a right to treatment
endows the inmate with better health care than his counterpart at
mental health unit does not require advanced degrees and, to a limited extent, can rely
on less expensive interns to assist in psychotherapeutic counseling.
98. Associated Press, Press Release (November 11, 1985) (Statement of Dr. John
Whelan, Chief of Psychiatric Services, Connecticut Department of Correction) (available
on NEXIS).
99. Todaro v Ward, 565 F.2d at 47.
100. See supra note 60.
101. This idea is not unique. See Neisser, supra note 55. Its practicality, however,
remains open to question. Requiring the prisons and the courts to rearrange their
schedules to accomodate physician appointments, as Neisser proposes, is perhaps too
burdensome a task to impose. However, the idea that medical and correctional lines of
authority and supervision be separated has merit. Such a separation would help ensure
that incarceration does not frustrate the delivery of health care services; moreover, it
would ensure that health care services are delivered according to considered, independ-
ent medical judgment, not according to the needs of the prison. Of course, such a
change would obviate the necessity for the standard of review proposed in this Com-
ment, since the standard is premised, at least in part, on the current poor state of medi-
cal care in prisons. If this Comment becomes obsolete, however, due to the advent of
adequate funding, adequate staffing and bureaucratic divisions that allow competent
medical judgment-so be it.
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liberty who, due to financial or other circumstances, cannot acquire
appropriate treatment.
There are several responses to this objection. First, courts have
already rejected a similar argument based on a state claim that im-
proving medical conditions at one prison would create a disparity of
treatment among the state's prisons. 0 2 The courts have focused
solely on the medical needs of the individual inmate and not on
whether, by comparison, he is better or worse off than another in-
mate similarly situated. Second, prisoners are denied Medicaid ben-
efits.' 0 3 When combined with other cost considerations, this creates
huge incentives for state officials to ensure that while the inmate
receives appropriate treatment, he receives only the minimum treat-
ment at the minimum cost from a physician of the prison's choosing.
Unlike his counterpart on the outside, the inmate has no choice as
to who administers what treatment where. Any fear that inmates
will receive comparatively luxurious treatment is simply unfounded.
Third, denial of equivalent health care cannot be justified as addi-
tional punishment. Punishment is the loss of liberty. As Estelle rec-
ognized, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause would have
little meaning if punishment were allowed to justify deprivations
reaching every aspect of a prisoner's life, especially were it allowed
to extend to denials of medical care.' 0 4 Fourth, treatment of the
inmate will not divert health care from those at liberty. For exam-
ple, an inmate requiring major, unique surgery-such as an organ
transplant-would not have a special or preferred claim for the lim-
ited supply of organs. Implementation of a right to treatment would
require only that prison officials ensure that an inmate has an op-
portunity equal to that of a free person, however limited, to be con-
sidered for the surgery.' 0 5 Finally, concerns over disparity of
treatment are particularly invalid for paraphiliacs, the majority of
whom will seek no treatment until incarcerated.
102. Todaro v Ward, 565 F.2d at 53. The state argued that the district court had
erred in ordering injunctive relief because care at the institution in question was no
worse than that at other correctional facilities. The Second Circuit dismissed this argu-
ment, saying that institutional practices were not required to be defective to a maximum
degree before a violation of constitutional rights could be found.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1970).
104. "The [Eighth] Amendment embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency .... ' " Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
105. Of course, if donor banks or surgeons refused to consider convicts for trans-
plants because they considered inmates to be undeserving, a problem of a different sort
would arise, a problem, however, which would not implicate prison medical authorities.
Special difficulties might also be posed by an inmate condemned to death who required





One danger of implementing the right to treatment as proposed
in this Comment is that legitimizing the use of organic-based thera-
pies carries with it possibilities of abuse by prison officials. One
prison official has already gone on record as advocating general use
of Depo-provera for the purpose of eliminating sexual assaults and
aggressive behavior among inmates.' 0 6 If the right to treatment is
to serve only the desired purpose of insuring adequate medical care,
inmates must be able to protect themselves from overzealous and
undesired application of treatments for reasons unrelated to their
well-being. Courts should be prepared to counter state attempts to
coerce unwanted treatment.
1. The Duty to Treat
In seeking to impose unwanted or unnecessary treatment, states
might assert that, once an illness is diagnosed, the state has a duty to
provide treatment in order to fulfill its constitutional obligation. 0 7
Indeed, states might assert that in treatment-specific disputes where
the alternative treatments are roughly equivalent, the state has the
right to choose the "better" treatment. For paraphiliacs, this would
justify the imposition of organic-based therapy without the
paraphiliac's consent. 10 8
106. Larry Meachum, Corrections Director of Oklahoma "would like to see
Oklahoma become a 'frontrunner' in studying the use of 'chemical castration' to control
sex offenders in overcrowded prisons." Meachum has also declared that "the future of
corrections in this country is going to be in incarceration, chemistry and electronics."
United Press International, Press Release (March 19, 1984) (available on NEXIS).
107. While the nature of the constitutional obligation demands that the state pro-
vide treatment where the medical need is serious and the treatment necessary, one com-
mentator has stated that a reciprocal duty to submit to treatment exists in the person
claiming a right to treatment. Katz, supra note 26. The duty to be treated resolves the
dilemma posed to the state by a patient who is incompetent or unable to accept or ap-
preciate the need for treatment. If treatment is necessary, then the questions that "must
be posed and answered are: Why, for whom, and within what limits?" Katz, supra note
26, at 767. The solution Katz proposes is to limit both the right and duty of treatment,
thereby creating "a right to treatment only for those who wish to exercise it or who after
a [limited] period of time have come to appreciate such a right and can benefit from it."
Katz, supra note 26, at 775. Katz views the latter limit as allowing for a limited period of
coerced treatment which may give an individual the ability to acquire, if possible, the
capacity to decide for or against treatment. Katz, supra note 26, at 773.
108. If the state were to argue a position similar to Katz, supra note 26, it would
claim the right to coerce organic-treatment for paraphiliacs, since its immediate effect
would be to enable the paraphiliac to feel what it is like to be "normal" and free from
the intrusive fantasies and urges associated with the disease. This position has certain
merit when one recalls that one apect of paraphilia is the subjects refusal to believe that
the conduct he engages in is at all deviant. See supra note 10. If this is the case, the
paraphiliac would be naturally hostile to treatment that sought to change his "normal"
behavior patterns. Coerced therapy would be required.
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Situations in which an inmate's ability to assert a right to receive
treatment does not allow the state to assert a duty to treat over the
inmate's objections can be distinguished on several grounds: the
degree of physical or mental discomfort treatment causes the in-
mate, the degree of risk associated with the side-effects of treatment,
and the intrusiveness of the treatment. 0 9 The greater the impact of
treatment upon the inmate, the greater the need to ensure voluntary
election of therapy. In Depo-provera treatments for paraphiliacs,
for example, extreme physical discomfort is associated with the side-
effects of the drug. This discomfort is not inconsequential, even if
reversible. The degree of risk of physical side-effects depends on
the physiology of the individual. For all individuals, however, Depo-
provera has a major intrusive effect on brain functions-mentation
is substantially altered. The intrusiveness of Depo-provera treat-
ment suggests that the patient's consent should be required. More-
over, voluntary election of therapy is essential in any organic-based
regime precisely because one component of the regime is psycho-
therapy. The goals of the psychotherapeutic techniques employed
are effectively thwarted and nullified if the patient is unwilling. "0
109. This is an arbitrary line, to be sure, but it speaks to the issue of whether in-
formed consent to a procedure should be required. If informed consent is made a pre-
requisite to a particular therapy, then election of that therapy should be completely
voluntary.
The intrusiveness of a given therapy is often raised in conjunction with a claimed right
to refuse treatment. The right has been frequently invoked by mental patients who re-
fuse psychotropic medication which can leave the patient in a state of near catatonia. See
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
The Supreme Court has declined to face the issue of the right to refuse treatment,
remanding a case which originated in Massachusetts and argued that the right to refuse
treatment was encompassed in the right of privacy. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982). The ostensible reason for the remand was that in the interim between granting
certiorari and delivering judgment, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Guardianship of
Roe v. Mass., 421 N.E. 2d 40 (1981), held that, under the Massachusetts constitution, a
right to refuse treatment existed, primarily because thought processes were protected as
a corollary of the right to express one's self.
Whether a right to refuse treatment will be found in the federal constitution remains
an open question. However, it seems clear that current interpretation of the right to
refuse treatment is an important factor in delimiting the duty to be treated, especially in
the context of an organic-based therapy that utilizes Depo-provera. There is little doubt
that Depo-provera affects mentation; it produces a "calming" effect on the brain, and it
disrupts the normal chain of biochemical processes that make up the testosterone-limbic
brain system. See Petitioner's Exhibit 25, Doe v. Bronson, supra note 1.
110. But see Katz, supra note 26, at 772-75. While psychotherapy requires the estab-
lishment of a collaborative relationship between patients and therapists, the quality of
the relationship required can vary. The relationship need not be an unequivocally posi-
tive one. Id. at 772 n.55. In implementing a duty to be treated, for example, the rela-
tionship would be required to exist even while treatment was being coerced. Id. As a
general rule, however, Katz acknowledges the need for cooperation and trust if psycho-




2. Coercion of Inmates: Tying Care to Benefits
To support the imposition of unwanted treatment, prison officials
can create circumstances such that inmates will accept treatment
without proper regard for its associated risks. The simplest method
of coercing treatment is to tie participation in treatment to liberty
interest decisions such as the granting of parole or goodtime. Prison
officials might attempt to use such ties to coerce all those eligible for
Depo-provera treatment, with its institutionally desireable side-ef-
fect of reduced aggressiveness, to participate in treatment.,
Because coercion in a prison environment is so likely, its possibil-
ity should be averted by forcing liberty interest decisions to be made
without the knowledge of whether an inmate has elected or refused
an organic-based therapy." 12 This is easily accomplished by keeping
medical records confidential. Such a practice has the additional
benefit of furthering physician/patient confidences which might aid
diagnosis and treatment in the first instance. The merits of such a
system are evident. It promotes self-selection among inmates who
desire organic-based therapies without forcing drastic changes in
the present practice of medical care delivery. Guards and other per-
sonnel, such as counselors, could continue in their present roles,
but would no longer be privy to the medical files or medical infor-
mation regarding the inmate. Even though they might suspect an
inmate was undergoing organic-based therapy, they would be un-
able to obtain confirmation from the medical file. Inmates too
would be instructed by prison physicians that their files are confi-
dential and inaccessible to any persons with control over liberty in-
terests. This suggests another desireable side-effect of
confidentiality, namely discouraging the inmate who seeks to make
111. "Liberty interests" refers to the spectrum of mechanisms that allow inmates to
leave prison before the expiration of their imposed sentence, the deprivation of which
cannot be accomplished without due process. Examples of liberty interests include
goodtime, parole, pardons, furloughs, half-way house eligibility, sentence modifica-
tions/commutations, or transfers to a minimum security, "open" facility. Even judges
are not immune from the temptation to coerce treatment. One judge attempted to do
so to an heir of the Upjohn fortune (the pharmaceutical corporation that manufactures
Depo-provera, an irony lost neither on the press nor the judge). The judge ruled that
the convicted heir had a choice between a five year prison sentence and a one year jail
term with probation subject to the condition that he undergo "chemical castration." The
Court of Appeals of Michigan overturned the sentencing judge's decision as imposing
an unlawful condition of probation, citing allegations that Depo-provera was unsafe and
not widely accepted. People v. Gauntlett, 184 Mich. App. 737, 352 N.W. 2d 310 (1984).
112. One problem with this neutralization technique is that it seems unfair to de-
prive an individual who has willingly sought, is undergoing, and is responding well to
organic-based treatment, from being able to take advantage of that fact in liberty inter-
est decisions. The response to this, though perhaps unsatisfactory, is that objective ob-
servations will bear out the improvements and changes in the affected person's
behavior, and reflect favorably in liberty interest decisions.
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the physician an ally in attaining favorable liberty interest
considerations.
3. Coercion of Physicians: Tying Care to Employment
Prison physicians hold their positions at the discretion of the
prison (or the state). They are subject to directives and requests
from the administrative staff of the prison. As members of an insti-
tutional workforce, prison physicians may internalize the policies
and goals of the institution." 3 State officials seeking to impose un-
wanted treatment can, therefore, either directly, by issuing direc-
tives or threatening to discontinue the physician's employment, or
indirectly, by establishing general prison policies, pressure physi-
cians to disregard inmate objections to treatment.
The prison physician can resist state pressure by raising the medi-
cal profession's ethical canons. These canons dictate that a physi-
cian's concern, first and foremost, must be for her patient." 14 The
ethical physician has an obligation to prescribe only the appropriate
treatment which, according to her considered medical judgment, is
warranted by her patient's medical needs. She must act without
consideration for the general level of health care in the prison, limi-
tations on available facilities at the prison, administrative desires to
treat for non-medical reasons or any social or political concerns."15
The ethical physician, therefore, can guard against coerced treat-
ment. A mechanism is required, however, to insure that prison phy-
113. Bazelon, The Prison Doctor and the Patient, 5 MAN & MED. 77, 79 (1980). One
author has also expressed his feeling that some prison physicians seek to stay as far away
from their patients as possible, 'Jails are often smelly, and [a prisoner's] appearance and
personal habits may seem repulsive (e.g., unwashed hair, foul odor, offensive tattoos,
obscene speech)." Lessenger, supra note 53, at 141.
114. The starting point for a survey of the ethics governing physician duties is the
Hippocratic Oath. "For twenty five centuries it has been the 'credo' of the profession,"
W. OSLER, THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN MEDICINE 63-64 (1921). The Oath states in rele-
vant part:
I swear by Apollo the physician and Aesculapius and Health (Hygieia) and All-Heal
(Panacea) and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and judg-
ment, I will keep this oath and this stipulation. . .. I will follow that system of regi-
men which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my
patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous.
• . •Into whatsoever houses I enter, I will go into them for the benefit of the sick,
and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and corruption. ...
Id. In addition, there are principles of medical ethics which decree that the first duty of
the physician is to the well-being of his patient. MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 64.
115. "[T]he physician should not delegate ... to any nonmedical person any matter
requiring the exercise of professional medical judgment." MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note
64, at § 5. Furthermore, though psychiatrists are encouraged to participate in social and
political activities and remain free from penalty for protesting social inequities, they
"should always be mindful of their separate roles as dedicated citizens and as experts in




sicians act as ethical physicians. One such mechanism might be an
independent review board authorized to scrutinize prison physicians
to determine whether they are in fact fulfilling their ethical obliga-
tions toward their patients.' 16
D. The Problems of Rehabilitation
Quite apart from those concerns related to implementation of
treatment-specific duties in prisons, the increasing use of organic-
based therapies for diseases such as paraphilia will create a second
set of problems for the state if treatment proves successful. Prison
administrators, legislators and the public at large will be forced to
confront the "creation" of what has been called the "new man" '" 7
someone whose psycho-organic problems are cured or controlled,
resulting in a person free of the impulses and behavior that identi-
fied him both for punishment and for organic-based therapy. This
is, with little dissent, "rehabilitation" in the truest sense of the
word."18 For the paraphiliac, it means freedom from the compul-
sions and drives that were manifested through deviant behavior.
Should the rehabilitation of a prisoner through organic-based ther-
116. See Neisser, supra note 55, at 961 (advocating the use of courts to establish stan-
dards for licensing, competence and professional judgment); Lichtenstein & Rykwalder,
supra note 57, at 596 (calling for the use of medical audits to supervise prison
physicians).
117. The term "new man" was first used to describe a British criminal, jailed for
numerous uncontrollable violent episodes, who was operated on for a bone chip that
was lodged in his brain. Immediately after surgery, the man sought release, claiming
that he no longer felt the violent urges that had made him commit crimes-that he felt
like a "new man." See Delgado, supra note 26, at 216. A similar, if not as spontaneous,
reaction has been noted among paraphiliacs when Depo-provera succeeds in lowering
testosterone levels. The case studies reported in Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 10, at
605, indicate that subjects treated with Depo-provera experienced "considerable relief
from obsessive erotic urges." Similarly, Gagne reported that his patients felt a "sense of
freedom accompanied the diminution in the frequency of sexual fantasies." Gagne,
supra note 10, at 645.
118. "Rehabilitation," in the classical penological sense, involves the use of thera-
peutic measures employed and designed to effect changes in the behavior of the con-
victed in the interests of his own happiness, health and satisfaction, and in the interest of
social defense. See Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 226 (1959). The objective is to produce an indi-
vidual whose propensity to violate societal norms has been reduced to acceptable levels.
Delgado, supra note 26, at 256. Others suggest that true rehabilitation further requires
self-reform and self-restraint. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Usid to "Treat?"
"Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL L. REv. 616, 657-658(1972). This of course raises the question of whether rehabilitation has really been ef-
fected if the physical substrates responsible for behavior have been removed without any
effort required of the inmate, as in the case of organic therapy. However, in successful
organic-based therapy, the psychological component-reform and restraint-is neces-
sary, and rehabilitation, therefore, may be said to have occurred. It should be noted,
however, that maintenance of the rehabilitation through continuing treatment is
required.
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apy, however, force a review of the prisoner's sentence? This sec-
tion does not attempt to answer this question definitively; instead, it
seeks to target the major areas of inquiry that should develop as
organic-based therapies become more sophisticated, and more in-
mates may be said to be rehabilitated.
One way of approaching the propriety of continued incarceration
is to examine how rehabilitation affects accepted rationales for in-
carceration. There are four generally accepted rationales: specific
deterrence, general deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation. 1 9
Specific deterrence-deterrence resting on the premise that con-
finement will reduce the propensity of a given inmate to commit an-
other crime 20 -is thoroughly undermined through successful
organic-based therapy. The paraphiliac's propensity to commit de-
viant sexual acts is either wholly eliminated through successful treat-
ment with Depo-provera, or at least reduced to the extent that,
statistically, there is little likelihood of it recurring.' 2 1
The general deterrence rationale focuses on the ability of punish-
ment to set an example for society as a whole.' 22 It may be that
punishment of the rehabilitated paraphiliac remains justified by this
rationale. Because the majority of the population will be unable to
distinguish between the aggressive, violent sexual offender and the
paraphiliac, incarceration of those who committed sex crimes be-
cause of a now-cured disease may deter those who are able to
choose whether or not to commit sex crimes.
Another rationale for incarceration is that it serves as retribution
to society for the crime committed. Retribution satisfies a societal
need for revenge, a need that remains unsatisfied even if a penal
system deters or rehabilitates the individual and even if the criminal
shows remorse or accepts responsibility for his actions. The crea-
tion of a "new man" probably has no effect on society's desire for
119. The "four classic principles" representing the goals of incarceration have been
characterized as deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and protection of the public.
Delgado, supra note 26, at 251 and n.234. This Comment substitutes the term "specific
deterrence" for "protection of the public" because it more clearly portrays the princi-
ple's focus on the inmate himself; incarceration under this principle is designed to deter
the individual inmate from further crime by giving him a taste of the penalty he can
expect.
120. Specific deterrence consists of after-the-fact inhibition of the person punished.
Specific deterrence rests on the assumption that the individual will avoid future conduct
which is likely to subject him to imprisonment again. Delgado, supra note 26, at 259-60.
121. Dr. Berlin claims an 85% success rate in treating paraphiliacs with Depo-
provera and psychotherapy. AP Press Release, supra note 34.
122. General deterrence involves inhibition in advance by the threat of punishment.
Delgado, supra note 26, at n.237. For an excellent discussion of the deterrence interest




revenge. However, insofar as retribution depends on an identity be-
tween the punishment and the individual as a focus for the commu-
nity's moral outrage, organic-based therapies successfully destroy
any such connection because the individual who committed the
crime, the uncured paraphiliac, ceases to exist.' 23
This section can only conclude that whether to continue incarcer-
ation of the rehabilitated paraphiliac remains an unresolved issue.
On the one hand, the desires of society for general deterrence and
retribution may best be served by the continued incarceration even
of those inmates treated successfully with organic-based regimens.
On the other hand, society's concern for the individual, and perhaps
the moral decency associated with a maturing society, might weigh
on the side of sentence reconsideration and a refocussing on reha-
bilitation as an acceptable goal.' 2 4 Whatever the approach to the
treatment of the "new man," it is clear that the issue can arise only
after implementation of a right to treatment. Whatever the con-
cerns of the state in this area, they should play no part in the consti-
tutional balancing involved in choosing between alternative
treatments.
V. Conclusion
Advances in medical science have produced a model of the under-
lying causes of paraphilia. Formation of the model, which posits
that the paraphiliac's deviant sexual behavior has both psychological
and organic roots, has suggested the use of organic-based therapy.
Depo-provera in combination with psychotherapy has been used
with great success in treating paraphiliacs.
Unfortunately, legal advances have not matched medical ad-
vances. Lower court application of the "deliberate-indifference"
prong of the Supreme Court's Estelle standard has left most impris-
oned paraphiliacs unable to obtain organic-based therapy. This
Comment has suggested that the deliberate-indifference test be re-
cast to account both for medical advances and for inadequacies in
prison medical care. Application of the modified standard would
123. See id., at 259-60.
124. Recently, the goal of rehabilitation has undergone a renaissance:
When we, as society, place a person behind walls and bars, we take on a moral
obligation-not a legal obligation, not a constitutional obligation-a moral obliga-
tion, to do everything within our resources to make that person better able to cope
when he comes out and rejoins the mainstream of society.
Burger, The Need for Change in Prisons and the Correctional System, 38 ARK. L. REV. 711, 725
(1985) (text of remarks delivered on April 28, 1984, at the Hartman Hotz Lectures in
Law and Liberal Arts).
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allow inmates to establish a presumptive right to treatment where
denial of a recognized medical treatment could be premised only on
the inadequacy of the prison's medical facilities or other non-medi-
cal concerns.
Of course, creating a presumptive right to treatment will not in
itself resolve the problems society faces in treating imprisoned sex-
offenders. For example, care must be taken lest prison officials
abuse the inmate's right and coerce undesired treatments. Never-
theless, recognizing that paraphiliacs can be treated while impris-
oned, and making that treatment available, are at least first steps
towards a coherent policy on medical treatment, and prison condi-
tions in general, for all inmates.
-Michael Yaki
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